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I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: EXPANDING THEORIES OF
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
A. Historical Background: The Beginning of the 20th Century
Although it seems almost unimaginable today, at the beginning of
the 20th century the United States Supreme Court actually gave
serious consideration to the issue of whether a corporation could be
held criminally liable for the acts of its employees After recognizing
that the old common law rule, reported in Blackstone's
Commentaries, was that a corporation could not commit a crime, the
Court went on to hold that corporations can be held criminally liable
based on the acts of their agents.2
The Court's decision in the New York Central case opened the
floodgates for a century of judicial decisions and legislative actions
that transformed the legal rules of corporate criminal liability.'
B. Mid-Century Cases: Dramatically Expanded Corporate Criminal
Liability
By the middle of the 20th century corporations were being held
criminally liable even for unauthorized actions by corporate
employees and agents, so long as those actions in some way benefited
the corporation.' All the courts required was some incidental benefit
to the corporation; liability could be imposed on the corporation when
agents were acting primarily to benefit themselves, at times resulting
1. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494
(1909).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Gilbert Geis & Joseph F. C. DiMento, Empirical Evidence and the Legal
Doctrine of Corporate Criminal Liability, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 341, 348 (2002) (discussing
the New York Central decision and its role in the creation of a federal body of law on the
subject of corporate criminal liability).
4. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962).
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in a loss to the corporation.5
Many corporate executives are surprised to learn that a
corporation can be held criminally liable even for unauthorized acts of
agents and employees that are contrary to company policy or even
contrary to specific instructions.6 All that is required in such cases is
that the agent or employee be acting within the scope of his or her
authority.7
C. Late 20th Century Cases: Aggressive and Creative Theories of
Corporate Criminal Liability
By the end of the 20th century, prosecutors were not content to
apply established theories of criminal liability to corporations. They
aggressively sought to develop new theories that would impose
liability on corporations in situations where application of traditional
theories would not support liability. An example is the "collective
knowledge" theory by which the actions and knowledge of a number
of employees is aggregated and imputed to the corporation to support
criminal liability.8
Other examples of expanded corporate criminal liability
embraced by the courts and by Congress include the public welfare
doctrine of strict criminal liability for corporations that commit public
welfare offenses9 and the corporate sentencing provisions of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations," which took effect
in 1991 (in section 905 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Congress
directed the United States Sentencing Commission to review and
amend the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and related policy
statements to implement the corporate compliance and accountability
provisions of that Act)."
D. The Turn of the New Century: Corporate Criminal Liability is the
Rule, Not the Exception
By the turn of the century, large-scale corporate prosecutions had
become commonplace, but with a new twist--criminal prosecution
5. See Steere Tank Lines v. United States, 330 F.2d 719, 722 (5th Cir. 1964).
6. See United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987).
9. See, e.g., United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619 (1st. Cir. 1974)
(explaining imposition of strict criminal liability under the public welfare doctrine).
10. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8, introductory cmt. (2002).
11. See discussion infra Part III.
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could literally kill the business entity. Although the Arthur Andersen
case may be the most recent and in some ways most dramatic
example, the trend was well underway before the Andersen
prosecution. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. failed to survive the
Michael Milken-related prosecution in the 1980s, and many believe
that E.F. Hutton's multi-count guilty plea in the check-kiting
prosecution ultimately led to the demise of that firm.13
Clearly by the turn of the century the stakes could not be any
higher in cases of corporate criminal liability-a criminal prosecution
may literally be a life or death crisis for a company.
II. THE OTHER SHOE FALLS: EXPANSIVE CORPORATE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY IS COUPLED WITH COOPERATION, VOLUNTARY
DISCLOSURE, AND SELF-REPORTING PROGRAMS
Although new theories of corporate criminal liability made it
easier to prosecute corporations in the late twentieth century, federal
prosecutors and regulatory authorities did not rely solely on those
theories to police corporate criminal activity. As corporate internal
investigations were increasingly used by defense counsel to assess and
remedy corporate wrongdoing, prosecutors began asking companies
that were subjects of criminal inquiries to turn over to the government
the results of their internal investigations.'4  Companies that
cooperated and took remedial action to prevent future criminal
misconduct could hope that the government would exercise
prosecutorial discretion and not proceed against the corporate entity,
or allow the corporate entity to plead guilty to lesser offenses, and
instead proceed primarily against the individual wrongdoers. 5
An important side effect of this new trend toward cooperation
and voluntary disclosure was pressure to waive attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine protection for all or parts of
reports of internal investigations that were shared with prosecutors.
12. See Lee Hockstader, Andersen Hit With Maximum Penalty; Judge Fines Firm
$500,000, Puts It on Probation, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 17, 2002, at E01, available at 2002
WL 101068791.
13. Id.; see also Michael B. Metzger, Corporate Criminal Liability for Defective
Products: Policies, Problems, and Prospects, 73 GEO. L.J. 1, 62-74 (1984) (discussing how
criminal law has been increasingly used to achieve an acceptable level of corporate
control).
14. See Memorandum from the Dep't of Justice, Eric H. Holder, Deputy Attorney
General, to All Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys § 1, 1 VI.A. (June 16, 1999),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html (last visited
Dec. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Holder Memorandum].
15. See id.
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Not surprisingly, before agreeing to favorable treatment based upon
an internal investigation and remedial action, prosecutors often
insisted upon access to the interview notes and privileged reports of
the counsel who conducted the internal investigation. That access
often necessitates waiver of attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine protection.
A. The Department of Justice's 1999 Memorandum on "Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations"
By mid-1999 these practices had become sufficiently
commonplace within the Department of Justice to be memorialized in
an internal policy memorandum by then Deputy Attorney General
Eric H. Holder, Jr. addressing Federal Prosecution of Corporations.
The Holder Memorandum "provides guidance as to what factors
should generally inform a prosecutor in making the decision whether
to charge a corporation in a particular case.
'16
Part II of the Holder Memorandum identified eight specific
factors that prosecutors should consider in making a charging decision
in a corporate criminal case. The fourth factor is: "The corporation's
timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to
cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the
waiver of the corporate attorney-client and work product privileges.' 17
Part VI of the Holder Memorandum, entitled "Charging the
Corporation: Cooperation and Voluntary Disclosure," reiterates that
"[i]n gauging the extent of the corporation's cooperation, the
prosecutor may consider the corporation's willingness.., to waive the
attorney-client and work product privileges."' 8
A footnote in the Holder Memorandum stated that the waiver
sought by the government "should ordinarily be limited to the factual
internal investigation and any contemporaneous advice given to the
corporation concerning the conduct at issue." '9 The first part of this
statement suggests - appropriately - that the focus of the cooperation
policy should be obtaining facts that were collected during the
corporation's internal investigation.
The second part of the statement, however, inappropriately
suggests that the government generally has a legitimate need to
compel a waiver for privileged communications of legal advice
16. Id.
17. Id. 9 II.A(4). (emphasis added).
18. Id. VI.A.
19. Id. at n.2.
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relating to the conduct at issue. That is not the case. Prosecutors need
access to attorney-client communications and opinion work-product
only if the corporation is relying on the advice of counsel as a defense
or if the government believes the crime-fraud exception is applicable.
In both of those situations the government is entitled to obtain the
privileged communications under recognized exceptions to the
privilege, and compelling a blanket waiver by the corporation is
unnecessary. Moreover, in both of those instances the applicability of
an exception to the privilege would be decided by a neutral judge, not
by a prosecutor whose objective is a successful criminal prosecution.
The same footnote in the Holder Memorandum goes on to state
that "[e]xcept in unusual circumstances, prosecutors should not seek a
waiver with respect to communications and work product related to
advice concerning the government's criminal investigation. 20 This
statement raises a significant issue of potential abuse of government
power. Requiring a corporate client to waive privileges with respect to
legal advice provided in connection with an ongoing criminal
investigation and potential prosecution, as opposed to legal advice
provided in connection with the past conduct that is the subject of the
pending criminal investigation, is effectively to deny that client
assistance of counsel in the pending proceeding.
Because of the breadth of the waiver doctrine, a corporate client
that waives privileges for advice and opinion work-product provided
in an ongoing investigation is likely to lose the benefits of a
confidential attorney-client relationship for all litigation and
regulatory proceedings arising out of or related to that investigation.
The Holder Memorandum does not describe what "unusual
circumstances" might justify requiring a waiver that would in effect
result in an across-the-board denial of counsel, and it is difficult to
envision a circumstance in which it would be appropriate for the
government to do so. In fact, the kind of circumstances that might
justify interfering with an ongoing attorney-client relationship, such as
misuse of counsel's advice to obstruct an investigation or destroy
evidence, would almost certainly be subject to the crime-fraud
exception to the privilege. In those kinds of cases the government can
overcome the privilege under existing law without compelling a
waiver.
As the discussion above suggests, the Holder Memorandum
suffers from two fundamental flaws. First, it inappropriately focuses
on obtaining privilege waivers in all cases, rather than on obtaining
20. Id.
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relevant underlying factual information, which is what government
investigators should be seeking in the typical case and which usually
can be obtained without requiring a waiver of privilege.
Second, the Holder Memorandum threatens to intrude
inappropriately into ongoing attorney-client relationships by
suggesting that in some cases prosecutors should seek a waiver with
respect to attorney-client communications and opinion work-product
relating to current representation in the pending criminal
investigation. Both of these flaws unnecessarily jeopardize the
continued viability of the attorney-client privilege in corporate
criminal cases, and both are inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
treatment of the corporate privilege in the leading case on that issue.2'
B. The Department of Justice's January 2003 "Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations"
In 2003, the Bush Justice Department revised the Holder
Memorandum. On January 20, 2003, Deputy Attorney General Larry
Thompson distributed a new memorandum on "Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations.
2
The Thompson Memorandum did not modify the waiver of
privilege and work product protection position of the Holder
Memorandum. The privilege waiver language of the Holder
Memorandum is carried over without substantive change. Thus the
Thompson Memorandum presumably reflects a policy decision by the
Justice Department to continue to aggressively pursue privilege
waivers. (This position is in notable contrast to the more carefully
articulated position of the Securities and Exchange Commission in its
official cooperation policy, discussed below.)
In another area, however, the Thompson Memorandum
markedly increases the pressure on corporations to cooperate with
criminal investigations and forego any effort to defend against
criminal charges. A new penultimate paragraph in Part VI(B) of the
Memorandum provides as follows:
Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether
21. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981) (recognizing the
importance of corporations receiving fully informed legal advice on how to comply with
the law).
22. Memorandum from the Dep't of Justice, Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney
General, to Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys (Jan. 20,
2003), available at www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm (last visited Jan. 5,
2004) [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum].
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the corporation, while purporting to cooperate, has engaged in
conduct that impedes the investigation (whether or not rising to
the level of criminal obstruction). Examples of such conduct
include: overly broad assertions of corporate representation of
employees or former employees, inappropriate directions to
employees or their counsel, such as directions not to cooperate
openly and fully with the investigation including, for example,
the direction to decline to be interviewed; making presentations
or submissions that contain misleading assertions or omissions;
incomplete or delayed production of records; and failure to
promptly disclose illegal conduct known to the corporation.23
This new guideline obviously increases the leverage the Justice
Department has over corporations and their counsel who are
responding to a criminal probe. For example, it may be difficult to
predict what prosecutors will consider "overly broad" assertions of
corporate representation of employees or what constitutes
"inappropriate" directions to employees or their counsel. Most
companies and lawyers may hesitate to take any of the actions, such as
seeking to control access to witnesses and documentary information,
that in the past have routinely been employed to defend corporations
against criminal charges. (Of course, there can be no assurance that
even if a company cooperates fully with the government it will receive
lenient treatment from the government, as the Arthur Andersen case
illustrates so dramatically.) 24
Taken together with the waiver provisions, the new
''cooperation" requirements in the Thompson Memorandum go quite
far toward effectively forcing a corporation to forgo any efforts to
defend against a criminal investigation if it hopes to ultimately obtain
favorable charging treatment at the hands of DOJ prosecutors. In
complex corporate criminal cases federal prosecutors have enormous
prosecutorial discretion to decide the nature and the number of
charges, if any, that they will bring against the responsible corporate
entity and culpable individuals. For that reason, the new, more
demanding cooperation policy set out in the Thompson Memorandum
is likely to have a significant impact on corporate behavior, perhaps
even fundamentally changing the manner in which corporations
respond to federal criminal investigations.
23. Id. I VI.B.
24. See Hockstader, supra note 12.
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C. The Securities and Exchange Commission's Cooperation Policy
The approach taken by the Department of Justice in the
Thompson Memorandum and its predecessor, the Holder
Memorandum, is not entirely consistent with the approach taken by
the other federal law enforcement agency with the greatest influence
on corporate behavior - the Securities and Exchange Commission.
In 2001 the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted a
formal agency policy of granting leniency in exchange for cooperation
in appropriate cases.25 The SEC announced its new policy inS 2 1
connection with an October 2001 enforcement proceeding. In Gisela
de Leon-Meredith, the Commission took action against an individual
corporate official for misstating her employer's financial results, but
did not take any action against the corporate entities whose financial
results had been misstated.27
The lack of enforcement action against the corporate parent was
particularly noteworthy because the company was publicly traded and
its financial statements had been misstated for five years in amounts
that were significant in relation to previously reported earnings.' In
such circumstances, a reporting company normally would do well to
avoid fraud charges by the SEC and be "let off" with financial
reporting and record keeping charges, but for the corporate entity not
to be charged at all was a significant act of leniency on the part of the
Commission and a notable departure from usual practice at the
agency.
Apparently recognizing the significance of its action (or, more
accurately stated, inaction) in not bringing an enforcement action
against the corporate issuer, the SEC took the unusual step of
explaining itself in a separate "Report of Investigation" that described
the reasons for its leniency toward the issuer in the Gisela de Leon-
Meredith case. 9
25. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(A) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency
Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at
2001 WL 1301408 [hereinafter SEC Report].
26. In re Gisela de Leon-Meredith, Exchange Act Release No. 44,970 (Oct. 23, 2001),
available at 2001 WL 1268303.
27. Id. at *3.
28. Id. at *2.
29. See SEC Report, supra note 25.
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1. Measures of Cooperation
In its press release announcing the report, the SEC identified
"four broad measures of a company's cooperation"3 that may
influence the agency's decision as to what enforcement action, if any,
should be brought against the company.
The four measures are:
Self-policing prior to the discovery of the misconduct, including
establishing effective compliance procedures and an appropriate
tone at the top; Self-reporting of misconduct when it is
discovered, including conducting a thorough review of the
nature, extent, origins and consequences of the misconduct, and
promptly, completely, and effectively disclosing the misconduct
to the public, to regulators, and to self-regulators; Remediation,
including dismissing or appropriately disciplining wrongdoers,
modifying and improving internal controls and procedures to
prevent recurrence of the misconduct, and appropriately
compensating those adversely affected; [and] Cooperation with
law enforcement authorities, including providing the Commission
staff with all information relevant to the underlying violations
and the company's remedial efforts.31
These measures of cooperation are unremarkable, and are
generally consistent with the policies of other agencies and the
cooperation provisions of the Federal Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines. The manner in which the application of these factors was
described in the accompanying SEC Report, however, is somewhat
troubling, particularly if the reader is not extremely attentive to the
details of the Commission's Report. The troubling aspect of the SEC
Report is that on its first page, in the second key paragraph describing
the SEC's reasons for not taking action against the parent company in
the Gisela de Leon-Meredith case, it emphasizes that "[a]mong other
things, the company produced the details of its internal investigation,
including notes and transcripts of interviews of Meredith and others;
and it did not invoke the attorney-client privilege, work product
protection or other privileges or protections with respect to any facts
uncovered in the investigation."32
30. Press Release, SEC, SEC Issues Report of Investigation and Statement Setting
Forth Framework for Evaluating Cooperation in Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, SEC
Press Release No. 2001-117 (Oct. 23, 2001).
31. Id.
32. SEC Report, supra note 25, at *1 (emphasis added).
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2. Attorney-Client Privilege Issues
This language about privilege, and the prominence it was given in
what was clearly intended to be a major policy statement by the
federal agency with principal responsibility for policing the financial
markets and regulating corporate America, is unfortunate because it
tends to distort an important nuance in what is otherwise a very
carefully considered and well-crafted policy statement by the SEC.
The privilege language quoted above could easily be read to
suggest that waiving privileges is necessary in order to obtain credit
for cooperation. That interpretation is incorrect, however, because a
close reading of the entire SEC Report makes clear that waiver of
privileges, as such, is neither an objective of the SEC nor a condition
for receiving full credit for cooperating with the agency.
Near the end of the SEC Report the Commission provides a non-
exclusive list of thirteen criteria that it may consider in determining
whether to give the subject of an enforcement action credit for
cooperation.33 The eleventh listed criterion identifies the relevant
issues with respect to assertion of attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine protection:
11. Did the company promptly make available to our staff the
results of its review and provide sufficient documentation
reflecting its response to the situation? Did the company
identify possible violative conduct and evidence with sufficient
precision to facilitate prompt enforcement actions against those
who violated the law? Did the company produce a thorough and
probing written report detailing the findings of its review? Did
the company voluntarily disclose information our staff did not
directly request and otherwise might not have uncovered? Did
the company ask its employees to cooperate with our staff and
make all reasonable efforts to secure such cooperation?
34
Unlike the gratuitous reference to not invoking privileges found
on the first page of the SEC Report, this language neither emphasizes
waiving privileges nor implies that doing so is necessary to obtain
credit for cooperation. Instead, the language appropriately focuses on
voluntary disclosure of all relevant underlying factual information,
including information that might not otherwise be discovered by
government investigators, and cooperation by the corporate entities
involved, such as by encouraging employees to cooperate with the
investigation. Moreover, the omission of any references to waiving
33. Id. at *2-*4.
34. Id. at *3.
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privileges in this criterion clearly is both a considered and intentional
decision by the agency, as an accompanying footnote explains.35
In the footnote on privileges, the SEC Report takes a more
measured approach to addressing the relationship between corporate
cooperation and privilege protections than the broad waiver policy of
the Department of Justice, discussed above. The SEC footnote
stresses the Commission's recognition that the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine, as well as other privileges,
"serve important social interests."36 The footnote goes on to state
explicitly that "the Commission does not view a company's waiver of a
privilege as an end in itself, but only as a means (where necessary) to
provide relevant and sometimes critical information to the
Commission staff." 3
The Commission has taken the position in litigation that "the
provision of privileged information to the Commission staff pursuant
to a confidentiality agreement [does] not necessarily waive the
privilege as to third parties."3 8 This language reinforces the point,
discussed below, that the SEC did not intend to suggest that waiving
privileges is necessary to obtain credit for cooperation. In fact, it
appears that the Commission would not regard providing even
privileged information (as opposed to underlying factual information)
as necessarily constituting a waiver.
The SEC took the right approach. As the discussion in the
footnote implicitly recognizes, it is possible, and even probable in
most cases, for a party under investigation to cooperate fully with the
government and provide investigators with all relevant underlying
factual information without waiving privileges. Nothing in the SEC's
carefully articulated analysis of the privilege issue suggests hostility to
the privilege or implies that waiver is necessary to obtain credit for
cooperation. To the contrary, the discussion not only demonstrates
sensitivity to the importance of the compelled privilege waiver issue,
but also a willingness to work with parties to avoid unnecessary
waivers that might undermine the continued vitality of the privilege.
The Commission's solicitous approach to the privilege and its
desire to avoid unnecessary waiver is further evidenced, although very
subtly, by the carefully chosen wording that is used in both the text
and privilege footnote. The text states that the company under
35. See id. at n.3.
36. Id.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. Id.
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investigation "did not invoke" the privilege, while the footnote states
that companies under investigation by the SEC may "consider
choosing not to assert" the privilege.39 The Commission's use of this
very precise language, rather than referring to "waiver" or "waiving"
the privilege, is consistent with the overall conclusion that the SEC
did not intend to require wholesale waivers of privilege by companies
under investigation in order to obtain the benefits of the new
cooperation policy. In fact, the footnote discussion indicates that, in at
least one litigated case,40 the SEC has taken the position that
voluntarily providing information to the SEC pursuant to a
confidentiality agreement should not operate as a waiver as to third
parties." In addition, there is a recent decision by an influential court
holding that providing information to law enforcement agencies
42pursuant to a confidentiality agreement does not constitute a waiver.
This is an important point that should be noted both by
companies that are under investigation by the SEC and by other
federal law enforcement authorities that are developing or applying
cooperation policies. In most cases, it will not be necessary or
appropriate for law enforcement officials to require waiver of
privileges by parties under investigation. If the investigating
authorities do require such waivers, they risk undermining the
important public policy interests that underlie the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine.
D. Other Federal Government Cooperation, Voluntary Disclosure,
and Self-Reporting Programs
As the Thompson Memorandum notes, a number of government
agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Department of Justice Antitrust Division, have "formal voluntary
disclosure programs in which self-reporting, coupled with remediation
and additional criteria, may qualify the corporation for amnesty or
reduced sanctions."43Counsel representing a business entity, and
particularly those whose business activities are subject to regulatory
oversight, must determine whether a regulatory agency's voluntary
39. Id. at*1, n.3.
40. Id. at n.3 (citing, Brief of Amicus Curiae SEC, McKesson HBOC, Inc. (Ga. Ct.
App. May 13, 2001) (No. 99-C-7980-3)).
41. Id.
42. See Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. Civ. A. 18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *6-
*12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 2002) (unpublished opinion).
43. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 22, VI.B.
2003]
SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW
disclosure policy applies to a given fact situation. An example is the
health care field, where the Department of Health and Human
Services has implemented a "Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol" that
provides for mitigation of penalties in exchange for voluntary
disclosure and cooperation with the Department's Office of Inspector
General.'
III. CONGRESS RAISES THE STAKES EVEN HIGHER: THE SARBANES-
OXLEY ACT OF 2002
On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed into law new accounting
reform and securities law/corporate governance legislation, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.4" Among other things, the Act provides
for the creation of a new public accounting oversight board, imposes
new reporting and corporate governance rules on public companies,
imposes new rules and requirements on accounting firms that audit
public companies, and establishes new criminal penalties for securities
fraud, destruction of documents, and knowingly filing false
certifications of the accuracy of periodic reports that contain financial
statements.46
The discussion that follows focuses on what may well be the most
controversial provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which is also the
provision that without question is most relevant to the role of counsel
in responding to evidence of criminal misconduct in the corporate
context. Section 307 of the Act provides as follows:
Not later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, the
Commission shall issue rules, in the public interest and for the
protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of
professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing
before the Commission in any way in the representation of
issuers, including a rule -
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material
violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar
violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal
counsel or the chief executive officer of the company (or the
equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to
the evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial
measures or sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring
44. See Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,399 (Oct. 30, 1998).
45. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
46. Id.
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the attorney to report the evidence to the audit committee of
the board of directors of the issuer or to another committee of
the board or to another committee of the board of directors
comprised solely of directors not employed directly or indirectly
by the issuer, or to the board of directors.
A. Effect of Section 307 on the Attorney-Client Corporate
Relationship
As the italicized language above suggests, this section of the Act
raises a number of significant statutory interpretation issues that the
SEC is seeking to address through adopting and interpretative
releases, discussed below, many of which may eventually have to be
resolved by the courts. Beyond these interpretation issues, however,
the Act has the potential to alter significantly the relationship
between public companies and their attorneys. On its face, section 307
appears to go quite far toward changing the role of corporate
attorneys from confidential advisors to public watchdogs and
whistleblowers. The effect of the new law may be to blur the
distinction between independent public accountants who have
traditionally played the public watchdog role,4' and outside counsel
who have enjoyed a confidential relationship with their corporate
clients49
In Upjohn the Supreme Court confirmed that the attorney-client
privilege and the work-product doctrine protect communications
between corporate counsel and the corporation's employees, so long
as the purpose of the communications is to provide legal advice to the
corporation and prepare for potential litigation.0 By extending the
availability of the attorney-client privilege beyond a corporation's
"control group" and by extending work-product protection to
interviews of lower level employees by corporate counsel, the Upjohn
Court recognized the importance of employees at all levels
communicating with corporate counsel and obtaining advice on
compliance with the law."
47. Id. (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002)) (emphasis added).
48. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 808-12 (1984).
49. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1981).
50. Id. at 390.
51. See id. at 392; see also Sherman L. Cohn, The Organizational Client: Attorney-
Client Privilege and the No-Contact Rule, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 754 (1997) ("The
Court's opinion clearly supports the idea that corporations need privacy to the extent
afforded by the attorney-client privilege to comply with laws, and that internal
investigations should be protected as a corporate effort to monitor compliance.") (citing
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The Upjohn Court was also concerned that without the
confidentiality protections of the attorney-client privilege and the
work-product doctrine, the depth and quality of investigations to
ensure compliance would suffer and employees might be deterred
from seeking advice on how to comply with the law. 2
Ironically, the outcome that the Supreme Court sought to avoid
in Upjohn in 1981 appears to be promoted, albeit indirectly, by the
attorney reporting requirements in § 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
The attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine protections
that the Court endorsed for corporations and other business entities in
Upjohn are undercut if attorneys representing the corporation are
viewed by corporate employees and officials as potential
whistleblowers rather than as trusted confidential advisers. In this
regard, § 307 seems likely to exacerbate the inherent tensions that are
present when an attorney represents a business entity that can act only
through individual officers and employees, who as individuals are not
the clients of that attorney.
B. SEC Rulemaking Activity to Date
In late 2002 the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed
implementing rules that went beyond the "up the [corporate] ladder"
reporting requirement in the text of Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 307,
set forth above. 3
1. The SEC's Original Proposal
The initial SEC rule proposal included a "reporting out"
requirement for counsel who do not receive an "appropriate
response" to their internal reporting of a violation. Under the initial
SEC proposal, outside counsel who do not receive an appropriate
response from the company are required to effect a so-called "noisy
withdrawal" by withdrawing from the representation and disaffirming
any submissions to the Commission that they have participated in
preparing that are tainted by the violation. 4 In-house attorneys are
not required to resign, but are required to disaffirm any tainted
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95).
52. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393 n.2.
53. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
Securities Act of 1933 Release Nos. 33-8150, 34-46868, SEC Docket (CCH) (Dec. 18,
2002), IV.A.
54. See id. I IV.A-B.
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submission they have participated in preparing." In addition, the
initial proposed rule provided that an attorney who reasonably
believes that he or she has been discharged by a company for fulfilling
the reporting obligations imposed by the rule may, but is not required
to, notify the Commission and disaffirm in writing any submission to
the Commission that he or she participated in preparing which is
tainted by the violation. 6
2. The SEC's "Up-the-Ladder" Attorney Reporting Rule
On January 24, 2003, the SEC announced it was approving a
"reporting up" rule, but was extending the comment period on the
"noisy withdrawal" provisions of the original proposed rule. 7 The
SEC approved the publication for comment of an alternative
proposal: 8
The Commission voted to extend for 60 days the comment
period on the "noisy withdrawal" and related provisions
originally included in proposed Part 205. Given the significance
and complexity of the issues involved, including the implications
of a reporting out requirement on the relationship between
issuers and their counsel, the Commission decided to continue
to seek comment and give thoughtful consideration to these
issues.
The Commission also voted to propose an alternative to "noisy
withdrawal" that would require attorney withdrawal, but would
require an issuer, rather than an attorney, to publicly disclose
the attorney's withdrawal or written notice that the attorney did
not receive an appropriate response to a report of a material
violation. 9
The final "up-the-ladder" reporting rule adopted by the SEC
seeks to clarify the interpretative issues arising under the language of
§ 307 and prescribes a detailed set of procedures to be followed by
counsel.'
On the important issue of what evidence is sufficient to trigger
55. Id. IV.B.
56. Id.
57. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Attorney Conduct Rule Under Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, SEC Press Release 2003-13 (Jan. 23, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2003-13.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2003).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Standards of Prof'l Conduct for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm. (last visited Dec. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Final
Rule Release].
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an attorney's reporting obligation, the new rule provides that
"[e]vidence of a material violation means credible evidence, based
upon which it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a
prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably
likely that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to
occur."6 The Final Rule Release explains that this language is
intended to impose an "objective standard" for reporting and that an
attorney is not expected to report gossip, hearsay, or innuendo.62
Another noteworthy aspect of the final up-the-ladder reporting
rule adopted by the Commission is that it abandoned a requirement in
the rule originally proposed by the Commission that a reporting
attorney document the report and the response thereto. In
abandoning the documentation requirement, the Commission
acknowledged that the comments it received on the proposed rule
were almost unanimously in opposition to the documentation
requirement, and that those comments raised legitimate concerns that
a documentation requirement has the potential to create a conflict of
interest between the lawyer and his or her client.63 For those reasons,
the final rule does not include any affirmative documentation
requirement.
The final rule includes detailed provisions on when an attorney is
"appearing and practicing before the Commission" (and therefore
subject to the rule), the procedures that must be followed in reporting
up-the-ladder, and the actions that an attorney must take if he or she
does not receive "an appropriate response" after reporting evidence
of a material violation.64 Those provisions merit careful attention and
study by all attorneys, as the definition of "appearing and practicing"
before the Commission is broad and the rule's application therefore
will be widespread.
As important as those technical provisions are, for purposes of
this discussion the most important aspect of the final rule as adopted
in January 2003 is that it does not include any mandatory "noisy
withdrawal" or "reporting out" requirements. The final rule does,
however, provide that an attorney "may reveal to the Commission,
without the issuer's consent, confidential information related to the
representation" in certain circumstances.6 Those circumstances
include (i) preventing the issuer from causing substantial injury to the
61. Id. § 205.2.
62. Press Release, SEC, supra note 57.
63. Id.
64. Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 205.4-205.5.
65. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (emphasis added).
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financial interest of the issuer or investors, (ii) preventing the issuer
from committing or suborning perjury or perpetrating a fraud on the
Commission, and (iii) rectifying the consequences of a material
violation by the issuer that caused substantial injury to the financial
interest of the issuer or investors in the furtherance of which the
attorney's services were used.6
3. The SEC's New Proposal on "Reporting Out" By Attorneys
Although these non-mandatory "reporting out" provisions of
the new rule are likely to be controversial, their import may be
eclipsed by other actions yet to be taken by the Commission on the
"reporting out" issue. In a separate release issued on the same day as
the Final Rule Release, the Commission extended comment on its
initial noisy withdrawal proposal and also proposed an alternative
approach to reporting out.67
In the Proposed Reporting Out Rule Release, the Commission
acknowledged the firestorm of criticism its initial noisy withdrawal
reporting out proposal had provoked. 68 In response to those
comments, the Commission proposed new alternative provisions that
prescribe attorney withdrawal in a narrower set of circumstances and
require the issuer (that is, the client) rather than the attorney to report
the attorney's withdrawal to the Commission.
The proposed alternative rule requires an attorney who does
not receive an appropriate response to his or her up-the-ladder
reporting of a material violation to withdraw from the representation
if he or she "reasonably concludes that there is substantial evidence of
a material violation that is ongoing or about to occur and is likely to
cause substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the
issuer or of investors., 7' The original proposal required withdrawal
when there was a "reasonable belief," as opposed to "substantial
evidence," of such circumstances. The Commission has solicited
comment on "whether requiring a different and higher evidentiary
standard for withdrawal than for reporting up-the-ladder of the issuer,
such as requiring an attorney to 'conclude' there is 'substantial
evidence,' will make the circumstances in which an attorney must
66. Id.
67. See Implementation of Standards of Prof'l Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg.
6324, 6324 (Feb. 6, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 205, 240, 249) [hereinafter Proposed
Purporting Out Rule Release].
68. See id. at 6325.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 6335 (emphasis added).
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withdraw (triggering an issuer's notification of the Commission) too
narrow to adequately protect investors."71
The other substantial change in the SEC's new proposed
reporting out rule is that the issuer, rather than the attorney, is
required to report the attorney's withdrawal to the SEC. The new
proposal provides that when an attorney provides an issuer with a
written notice of withdrawal, based upon the attorney having not
received an adequate response to his or her up-the-ladder reporting,
then the issuer must within two days report the withdrawal to the SEC
by filing a Form 8-K with the Commission. If the issuer fails to comply
with this reporting requirement, the withdrawing attorney may, but is
not required to, inform the SEC of the withdrawal.72
Two things about this proposed alternative reporting out
procedure should be noted. First, the issuer's report on Form 8-K that
the SEC is proposing is similar to the reporting required for a change
in a company's independent accountant under existing SEC rules.73 By
treating attorney withdrawal in a manner similar to changes in
independent auditors, the Commission will blur the line between
independent auditors, who play a public watchdog role and are in a
quasi-adversarial relationship with their clients, and corporate
counsel, who up until now have been advocates and advisers, and have
had a confidential relationship with their clients.74 Blurring this
previously clear distinction could fundamentally alter the nature of
the relationship between corporations and their attorneys, arguably in
a way that is contrary to the guidance the Supreme Court has
provided on this important legal issue.
Second, and perhaps even more important, the alternative
procedure proposed by the SEC, in which the client rather than the
lawyer reports the withdrawal to the SEC probably is a distinction
without a real difference. In either case, the attorney's decision to
withdraw will set in forth a chain of events that by law must culminate
with notification of law enforcement officials.75 Both procedures are
likely to undermine significantly the relationship of trust and
confidence between corporations and their counsel. Moreover, as
71. Id. at 6328.
72. See id.
73. See SEC, Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of
Filing Date, No. S7-22-02, 2002 WL 1315511, § 4 (June 17, 2002).
74. See supra Part III.A (discussing the Arthur Young and Upjohn Supreme Court
cases).
75. Under either proposal it may be the attorney who reports to the Commission, as
under the alternative proposed rule an attorney who wishes to do so may inform the
Commission if his or her former client fails to report the withdrawal as required by law.
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discussed below, both approaches are likely to undermine the
attorney-client privilege in the corporate context.
C. Section 307 and Waiver of Privilege Protections
Remarkably, in its original rule proposal, the SEC took the
position that an attorney's notification to the Commission under the
proposed rules does not breach the attorney-client privilege.76 The
SEC repeated that position in the Proposed Reporting Out Rule
Release, but acknowledged that its alternative proposal requiring the
issuer, rather than the attorney, to report out to the Commission was
intended to address commenters' concerns "related to the attorney-
client privilege."77 The Commission's position on the attorney-client
privilege waiver issue notwithstanding, courts and litigants will no
doubt expend considerable energy grappling with this issue if either
form of the "reporting out" rule is ultimately adopted by the SEC.
Although the privilege waiver issue presumably will remain
unresolved until the SEC both formulates a final rule and the rule is
tested in the courts, two points should be noted. First, it is noteworthy
that the text of the statute, quoted above, imposes only internal
reporting requirements, for which compliance does not raise attorney-
client privilege issues, while both the SEC's initial proposed rule and
the alternative proposal rule announced on January 23, 2003, go
beyond the statute and impose external reporting requirements that
raise serious attorney-client privilege issues. The SEC presumably
reads the "including a rule" language in § 307, set out above, as
providing the agency with statutory authority to promulgate rules in
addition to the "reporting up" through the corporate hierarchy rule
that is specifically required by the Act. Even if the SEC reads the
"including a rule" language this way, whether the SEC's proposed
"noisy withdrawal reporting out" rule is a wise exercise of the
agency's rulemaking authority is a separate question-particularly
when one of the foundations of our adversarial legal system is at
stake.8
Second, whether adopted in the initial proposed form or in the
revised form announced by the SEC in the Proposed Reporting Out
76. See Proposed Reporting Out Rule Release, supra note 67, at 6326.
77. See id. at 6329.
78. Cf Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (stressing the
importance of employees at all levels of a corporation communicating freely with
corporate counsel so as to ensure that corporations receive informed advice on how to
comply with the law).
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Release, any "reporting out" requirement imposed by the SEC will
clearly have a profound effect upon the relationship between
attorneys and clients in the context of corporate representations.
While it is impossible to predict the magnitude of that effect at this
time, before final rules are adopted and subjected to judicial review, it
is unlikely that such a rule could have a positive effect on the
attorney-client privilege or the relationship between corporate clients
and their counsel.
Whether or not the SEC adopts a reporting out rule to
supplement the up-the-ladder reporting rules it has already adopted, §
307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will increase the pressures on business
entities to waive the protections of the attorney-client privilege and
the work-product doctrine when evidence of misconduct subject to the
§ 307 reporting requirement is discovered.
The Justice Department's "Thompson Memorandum" and the
SEC's new cooperation policy, discussed above, both require prompt
self-reporting of violations of law if corporations wish to receive
lenient treatment from the government. Of course, none of these
policies provide any assurances of lenient treatment, so a company
that seeks to obtain lenient treatment by self-reporting does so at its
own risk - as illustrated by the DOJ's decision to seek felony
convictions of Arthur Andersen after that firm voluntarily reported
destruction of documents relating to its work for Enron.79
For these reasons, when confronted with a § 307 report, a
corporation may well conclude that it has no practical alternative but
to report the matter to law enforcement authorities. When that
occurs, outside attorneys who reported the matter under § 307 will
have set in motion a chain of events that may result in a waiver of
privilege and, in some cases, criminal prosecution of their client. It is
difficult to reconcile this scenario with the approach that the Supreme
Court took in Upjohn, when it stressed the importance of the
attorney-client privilege in the corporate context to facilitate thorough
internal investigation of potential wrongdoing and confidential
counseling to foster future compliance with the law. It is also difficult
to imagine how this scenario can do anything but undermine the
79. See Kurt Eichenwald, Arthur Andersen Convicted of Obstruction of Justice, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com ("In early January, as lawyers
for the firm were examining laptop computers for e-mail messages related to Enron, the
were stunned to discover that the records had been wiped clean. In the days that followed,
top executives of the accounting firm learned of the huge effort to destroy documents in
the fall. Andersen alerted the S.E.C., the Justice Department and the Congressional
committees investigating Enron.").
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relationship between corporate attorneys and their clients.
IV. CONCLUSION: CAN A BUSINESS ENTITY STILL CONTEST OR
EVEN AGGRESSIVELY DEFEND AGAINST CRIMINAL CHARGES?
The new laws and law enforcement policies that are described
above have altered the rules of the game for counsel defending white
collar criminal cases involving corporations and securities law
violations. Companies that do anything other than voluntarily self-
report evidence of a possible crime and then cooperate fully with the
government's investigation are proceeding at great peril. The rewards
for cooperation, and the accompanying disadvantages of not
cooperating, are now very substantial. To receive full credit for
cooperation, companies may even have to waive privileges and assist
the government in building criminal cases against present or former
employees. Overall, the position of companies who are at risk of being
charged with criminal conduct has been substantially weakened and
the role of outside counsel significantly complicated by the need to
assess the benefits of cooperating against the risks of aggressively
defending against a criminal investigation.
On the other hand, none of the laws or law enforcement
policies described above provides any absolute guarantees or
assurances of lenient treatment by law enforcement authorities when
a company self-reports and cooperates with the government (and as
the Andersen case demonstrates, the consequences of voluntary
disclosure may be catastrophic even when a company takes steps to
self-report and cooperate).
Privilege waiver also is a significant risk if the company elects to
cooperate, and counsel should devote careful attention to the waiver
issue. While the government cooperation policies suggest that waiver
of privilege is required in order to receive credit for cooperation, the
policies do not explicitly require it in all cases. The better and more
carefully articulated policies, such as the SEC's cooperation policy,
suggest that in most cases cooperation sufficient to obtain lenient
treatment should be possible without waiving privileges.
If counsel proceeds carefully, it may be possible to cooperate by
providing government investigators with relevant factual information
but not disclosing privileged attorney-client communications or work-
product that reflects the opinions or legal theories of counsel. In some
cases, such as those in which the government insists on broad privilege
waivers, the best approach may still be to decline to cooperate and
force the government to overcome the presumption of innocence by
2003]
170 SOuTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:147
proving its case with evidence developed through its own
investigation. Such cases may now be the exception, rather than the
rule, however, in what may be a new era of white-collar criminal
practice.
